Exploring Africa’s exposure to global fertiliser supply disruptions and the opportunity to strengthen agricultural resilience through locally available soil amendments.
Publication note: This op-ed was originally published on 27 May 2026. The supporting fertiliser supply analysis below was updated on 06 July 2026 to reflect the latest available developments.
Featured articleOriginally published by African Business on 27 May 20264 minute read
As fertiliser shortage bites, Africa must look to its own soil
African BusinessYemi Osinbajo and James Irungu Mwangi
Until now, African farmers navigating fertiliser shortages have mostly been dealing with logistics and procurement failures – frustrating, but manageable. What is coming for the 2026–2027 planting seasons is neither logistical nor manageable. It is structural, and it is of a different order entirely.
Global urea production is down 11%, with a further 4% at immediate risk. Africa, running on 4% of global supply, is not facing a more expensive import season – it is facing no import season.
The standard framing – fertiliser prices up, food prices follow – accurately described the 2022 crisis caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It is dangerously misleading this time. An industry running at 80% to 85% utilisation globally has no surge capacity. With 12m tonnes of annual production capacity for liquefied natural gas – an essential input to fertiliser production – destroyed, taking months if not years to rebuild, the shortfall will persist across the affected seasons: it cannot simply be recovered when inputs return.
When supply falls, demand is forced to fall with it. The price goes up to the point where it excludes buyers who cannot afford the clearing price. Africa’s smallholder farmers are always last in the queue – and in a market this tight, that means no supply at all. They will not simply pay more. They will be shut out of the market entirely. Expanding African urea production will not solve this immediate supply shortage. Building new African urea capacity is a reasonable long-term ambition – but it will not help a single farmer in 2026 or 2027.
Building new capacity requires long lead times and substantial capital investment. Even then, urea is a globally traded commodity: local production does not guarantee local access, because producers sell at a global market price.
In a supply-constrained market, domestically produced urea competes with the same deep-pocketed international buyers that are already crowding out African importers.
An African fertiliser supply chain
The only supply chain Africa fully controls is the one it builds from its own soil. Soil amendments made from local agricultural inputs – biochar, bio-stimulants, compost blends – are not traded on global commodity markets. They cannot be priced out by stronger buyers. For the planting seasons that matter now, they are the only supply chain Africa actually controls. Accelerating their production now builds agency and resilience to future shocks.
The evidence for these alternatives is already compelling. In northern Ghana, biochar combined with compost and half-rate synthetic fertiliser increased maize yields by 106% in 2023 and 127% in 2024, compared to unfertilised control plots – outperforming full-rate chemical fertiliser applied alone. A global dataset of 367 peer-reviewed studies across 37 countries confirms that biochar consistently improves yields, with the strongest effects in tropical soils. These alternatives and supplements can make scarcely available synthetic fertiliser achieve more, and help rebuild soil health over time.
The underlying soil conditions amplify the supply shock. Around 75–80% of Africa’s cultivated land is already degraded. Approximately $4bn in soil nutrients are lost to erosion each year. Synthetic fertiliser applied to degraded, acidic soils consistently underperforms expectations. The access crisis lands on a base that was already failing.
If the right actors move now, this crisis could accelerate an industry that would otherwise take a decade to build, including pyrolysis facilities, agricultural waste collection, blending, distribution and agronomic advisory. That industry is locally anchored by design – built from inputs that are structurally immune to the commodity pricing dynamics that created this crisis, supporting the 50m smallholder families who produce 80% of Africa’s food, and retaining value on the continent rather than exporting it as commodity rents.
If that window closes – as global supply normalises and systems revert to synthetic defaults – the continent remains just as exposed to the next shock.
Let’s build Africa’s resilience from waste.
Yemi Osinbajo is the former Vice President of Nigeria and chair of the Climate Action Platform for Africa (CAP-A). James Irungu Mwangi is the CEO of Africa Climate Ventures (ACV) and founder of CAP-A.
Urea doubled within months, past US$900/t (highest since the 2022 peak). Multi-country farmgate impact: Tanzania (Mbeya, Songea) — the spike hit at top-dressing, so farmers cut application rates or delayed, and stock did not reach the interior in time, raising maize-yield and local food-price concerns; Kenya (Trans-Nzoia, Uasin Gishu) — high DAP cost and inconsistent subsidised access via cooperatives forced farmers to cut acreage or skip basal fertiliser; Zambia — disrupted national procurement led to late Central/Southern deliveries past the optimal nitrogen window; Côte d'Ivoire / West Africa cocoa belts — high costs and inconsistent shipments mean deferred maintenance fertiliser, risking bean yield and quality. Path forward: localised blending and regional infrastructure (esp. East Africa), crop-specific nutrition, and enhanced-efficiency products (biostimulants, nano- and water-soluble NPK).
Benchmark urea has more than halved from its wartime peak since the Strait of Hormuz reopened on 17 June — New Orleans barges fell from ~US$782 to about US$350/short ton by late June (below the pre-conflict level), per StoneX — yet East and Southern African farm-gate prices for urea, DAP and NPK remain at or near record highs (Uganda, Rwanda, Malawi, Mozambique): an explicit breakdown in price transmission to African farm gates, driven by dollar pricing against weak local currencies, war-risk freight and import dependence, with El Niño threatening southern rains. World Bank: the fertiliser index rose >12% in Q1 (highest since Oct 2022), urea is averaging ~60% higher in 2026, with relief expected only in 2027; US retail urea was US$718/t in early July (+9% y/y), DAP US$910 (+12%), per DTN. Capacity ≠ access: Nigeria (Dangote's ~3 Mt urea complex, Indorama) is a net exporter with far smaller farm-gate swings, while Morocco's OCP — sitting on ~70% of global phosphate-rock reserves (USGS) — slowed output for want of imported sulfur and ammonia, and DAP stays unaffordable for smallholders.
IFDC / AfricaFertilizer (Sustain Africa)Africa (multi-country) / global
With the Strait of Hormuz reopened, IFDC reports trade confidence restored and Iranian urea exports resumed; combined with China gradually raising shipments after eased controls, urea availability has improved and prices softened (notably in Asia). Phosphates stay firm — the binding constraint has shifted from logistics to production economics, with high sulfur cost keeping DAP/MAP tight. Policy: at end-June the US suspended anti-dumping duties on Moroccan phosphate imports for eight months. Emerging El Niño conditions are flagged as a compounding risk (Horn of Africa drought). Africa framing: still import-dependent and fragmented; priority actions are regional manufacturing (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa), AfCFTA trade, blending/storage, and soil-health / precision agriculture.
Benchmark urea (CFD) fell to about US$362/t on 2 July 2026 — down ~18% over the preceding month — while remaining above both pre-war and year-earlier levels. Signals the April price spike is unwinding even as physical access in import-dependent markets lags.
USDA launched the $500m FIELDS programme (via Rural Development / Commodity Credit Corporation) to build and expand domestic fertiliser MANUFACTURING (nitrogen, phosphate, potash, sulfur), plus storage and transport. Awards US$15–150m; applications close 15 Aug. Successor to Biden's $900m Fertilizer Production Expansion Program (of 121 projects, 8 completed). It is production expansion, not stockpiling.
The International Fertilizer Association's authoritative exposure figures: of global trade upstream of the Strait of Hormuz, ammonia is 23%, urea 34%, sulfur 49% and MAP+DAP 18%. IFA flags ripple effects — gas curtailments to South Asian producers (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh) and higher European gas hitting marginal-cost nitrogen producers. IFASTAT is the reference source for global capacity, production, trade and consumption statistics.
After the 15 June US–Iran interim deal, fertiliser began trickling out of Hormuz — roughly 640,000 t of sulphur left the strait — but traffic stayed a fraction of pre-war, with 500+ ships still stranded. Analysts stress the flows are against old sales, not fresh tonnage: CRU counted ~600,000 t of urea still stuck and expected no significant pickup before August, while damaged Gulf production facilities await repair. Argus put 300,000–400,000 t of sulphur still waiting to exit.
IFPRI analysis: urea rose from ~US$490 to ~US$780/mt (+59%) within a month. Liquidity-constrained smallholders respond by cutting application rates, reducing planted area or switching to less input-intensive crops — lowering yields and pushing food prices up. The subsidy/voucher debate is resurfacing. IFPRI model results suggest Nigeria, as an oil and urea producer, could see net welfare gains overall even as farm-gate costs rise.
Global Trade Review (J. Basquill)Africa & Asia (Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa; global)
Experts warn the shock has already hit food production in Africa and Asia, with effects that could last into 2027. Kleos Advisory's Tedd George says southern-hemisphere planting is running into anecdotal input prices two-to-three times year-ago levels and calls the likely yield hit 'disastrous'; Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa are directly exposed via Gulf sourcing. FAO's Máximo Torero framed farmers' options as cutting use, switching crops, or absorbing costs.
Government (Presidential Fertiliser Initiative, PFI NPK Ltd) says early procurement — nine vessels / 407,304 mt — locked in prices before the spike, saving ~US$43.99m: GAS US$228 vs US$343 spot, DAP US$775 vs US$950, MOP US$400 vs US$430. It says Nigeria has been shielded while other African countries face supply gaps ahead of planting.
India's state importer NFL received bids as low as US$445–449/t CFR on its 1.7 Mt tender — roughly 50% below the April peak (~US$935/t) — as China reopened exports; ~6.24 Mt of bids came from ~34 firms. An official cautioned the relief may only last 'until August 2026' before China tightens curbs again.
The All India Kisan Mazdoor Morcha held effigy-burning protests across 22 Punjab districts (part of a five-state campaign) over an acute urea shortage, demanding fair supply at reasonable rates during the sowing window.
IFPRI's live tracker of food and fertiliser export restrictions. As of the 3 June update, China continues to restrict key fertiliser exports (urea, phosphates) through quotas and other controls to secure domestic supply, and IFPRI judges current trade disruptions to be driven more by fertiliser export restrictions from large suppliers than by food measures. Next update scheduled 15 July 2026.
Africa-wide June snapshot. Middle-East urea had eased to about US$630/mt by early June but was still ~28% above pre-war levels; phosphates elevated, potash edging up; markets overall 22–28% above pre-war. Tanzania's ~32% urea subsidy is cushioning farmers; Ethiopia is expanding capacity (Dangote Gode, raised to US$4bn); Kenya imported ~400,000 mt early-2026 but faces uncertainty over NPK from Chinese suppliers; ECOWAS is standing up regional joint-purchasing.
Daily Nation (Nation Media)Kenya (North Rift / western)
Subsidised top-dressing and DAP were unavailable at many NCPB depots across the North Rift and western Kenya grain belt, forcing smallholders to private dealers: subsidised CAN meant to sell at ~KSh1,950/90kg was scarce, with private bags ~KSh2,800; unsubsidised 50kg planting fertiliser reached KSh6,000–6,500 and top-dressing KSh4,500–4,700 at agrovets. Farmers in Nandi, Bungoma and elsewhere sourced supplies from distant counties. NCPB disputed a 'widespread' shortage, citing a brief (~two-week) interruption from a demand surge after early long rains and attributing delays partly to Middle East supply-chain rerouting; FEWS NET flagged the season.
Ship-tracking data show the fertiliser supply shock has NOT rerouted the way other Hormuz-affected flows partially did: 40+ vessels carrying >2 Mt of fertiliser remained bottled in the Middle East Gulf with no meaningful export offset via alternative ports; urea was quoted near US$1,000/t in parts of the US. Kpler warns growers may be covered short-term but 2026/27 crop coverage is thinner, so yield effects are likely to show more in the 2027 crops unless Strait trade returns.
China reissued urea export quotas — its first since the March ban — for June–August: ~1.5–1.6m t (plus a possible ~400,000 t government-to-government), with FOB floors of US$660/t prilled and US$670/t granular. Profercy attributes the recent softening partly to demand deferral and destruction since April's peak, and to China redirecting EXISTING supply to export, not new production capacity.
The Commission adopted the Fertiliser Action Plan on 19 May in response to the shock: April 2026 EU nitrogen prices were 71% above the 2024 average. EU ammonia output is declining — permanent closures since 2023 account for 9% of EU capacity. The plan promotes European bio-based alternatives (digestates, algae biomass, biostimulants, microbial solutions, nutrient recovery) and examines strategic stockpiling and joint procurement. The Middle East is ~35% of global N exports though the EU's direct dependence is small (~3% of ammonia imports).
FAO's May review of policy responses: China extended urea export restrictions until August 2026 and quota-limited sulfuric acid; Russia extended fertiliser export quotas to December 2026 and suspended ammonium-nitrate export licences; Türkiye banned sulphur exports; the Republic of Korea BANNED urea hoarding via stockpiling restrictions and distributor monitoring. 39 countries adopted fertiliser measures Feb–Apr; exporters largely prioritised domestic supply.
World Bank Blogs (Apr 2026 Commodity Markets Outlook)Global
World Bank April 2026 Commodity Markets Outlook: the fertiliser price index is projected to rise >30% in 2026; urea topped US$850/t in April (+80% since February; highest since 2022), driven by the Hormuz closure and outages — Iran halted ammonia, Qatar suspended urea/ammonia/sulfur after facility damage, India cut output on lower LNG. Prices expected to ease only in 2027 as exports recover and new supply comes online.
South African grain farmers saw fertiliser prices spike up to 59% in a month (Grain SA April monitoring); SA imports >80% of its ~2m t requirement. The piece frames soil health — composting, regenerative/biological approaches — as the structural hedge, echoing the CAP-A soil-amendment argument.
Subsidised CAN top-dressing (meant to retail ~KSh1,950/90kg) was unavailable at many NCPB depots in the North Rift maize belt, forcing smallholders to private dealers at ~KSh2,800 (~+44%). Agriculture PS Paul Rono attributed delays partly to Hormuz-related rerouting via South Africa; NCPB cited high seasonal demand.
Bloomberg (via Farm Progress), citing CRUMiddle East / global
Bloomberg, citing CRU Group, reports that the effective closure of Hormuz forced Middle East urea manufacturers to curb operations, with 55–60% of output potentially halted. Producers were using vessels stuck in the strait as floating storage — laden ships unable to exit, empty ones not coming in — raising the risk of further shutdowns as storage fills.
In Q1 2025, Nigeria exported the bulk of its fertiliser to Brazil (~43%, US$241m), the US (~28%, US$158m) and India (~18%, US$101m); producers are Dangote, Indorama and Golden. Separate data put Dangote at ~37% of its 3 Mt/y urea output to the US alone, and market analysts estimate ~70–77% of Nigerian producers' output now goes to export markets (Dangote ~77% of its urea production) — an export economy even as domestic smallholders struggle to access affordable supply.
Early-crisis Africa risk map (IFDC Crisis Response Bulletin #6). Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire at medium-to-high risk; Nigeria a regional stabiliser via domestic urea; East Africa steady short-term but risk rising; landlocked Sahel exposed via transit corridors. As of early April, physical shortages were 'not yet prevalent' but logistics and speculation were tightening supply.
CRU: QatarEnergy halted LNG and associated products after strikes on Mesaieed/Ras Laffan, shutting QAFCO's 5.6 Mt/y Mesaieed urea plant on 4 Mar — the first confirmed regional production impact. Duration is the key variable. India's domestic output was hit (IFFCO, Chambal, Kribhco, GNFC), with ~300,000 t of losses; Pakistan's Agritech halted on LNG force majeure.
Platts: the cost of domestic European ammonia production (US$697/mt on 3 Mar) exceeded the import price (US$690/mt) for the first time since June 2025, up >US$250/mt since 27 Feb. European producers began cutting output and withdrawing offers — LAT Nitrogen pulled all offers and reduced production on 3 Mar; Bloomberg separately reported Slovakia's Duslo cutting ammonia to 'technical minimum' around 12 Mar.
The Western Producer (relaying Yara / Argus)Global
Yara's nitrogen chief Magnus Krogh Ankarstrand: urea capacity additions outside China peaked at ~4.5 Mt in 2023 versus only ~300,000 t added in 2025, and consumption growth is expected to outpace capacity growth in three of the next five years. Argus's Owen Gooch noted Middle-East urea rose ~US$60/t in January alone.
